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INTRODUCTION: THE MILITARIZED RESPONSE TO A
RISING BODY POLITIC
On September 17, 2011, a group of protesters congregated
in Liberty Square, located in New York City’s Financial Dis-
trict.1  This group of protestors, known nationally as Occupy
Wall Street,2 took over the square and peacefully protested for
† B.A., Columbia University in the City of New York, 2013; J.D., Cornell Law
School, 2016; Notes Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 101.  To God be the
glory.  I would like to thank my family, especially my brother Hiram Marcos
Arnaud and mentor Thomas Giovanni, for their influence and inspiration.  I would
also like to thank Sara G. Trongone, R. Kyle Alagood, and Professor John D. Inazu
for their helpful edits, comments, and suggestions.  I am also grateful to Mary
Beth Picarella and Brian Eneoreuwu Jones for their hard work during the editing
process.  Hasta la victoria, siempre.
1 About, OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ [http://
perma.cc/U9UM-V5JB].
2 Occupy Wall Street was the beginning of a greater movement that spurred
the creation of “occupy” movements throughout the United States in various
cities.  The movements would physically occupy a certain piece of public property
and use that property to assemble and express themselves. Background, OCCUPY
777
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several months.  The movement, inspired by the popular upris-
ings in Egypt and Tunisia, focused on fighting against, and
creating awareness of, economic inequality in the United
States.3  Police officers observed the Occupy protestors
throughout the several months that they settled and lived in
Liberty Square in Zuccotti Park.  On November 15, at 1:00
A.M., the police raided and evicted the Occupy protestors from
Zuccotti Park.4  A few hours and nearly two hundred arrests
later,5 New York City Police Department (NYPD) officers cleared
the park and the genesis of the only mass, class-based protest
of the past decade was over.  The way in which the NYPD forces
dealt with the protestors and their subsequent eviction raises
serious questions of human and civil rights violations, not least
among which are the many incidents of police brutality.6  The
displacement of the New York City Occupy Movement sparked
many questions regarding the nature and legitimacy of police
power and the right to peaceable assembly: Why did the NYPD
end a widely peaceful assembly?  Do protestors have the right
to voice their concerns, and the concerns of thousands of
others, in a public space for a prolonged period?  Should police
be authorized to use or display machine guns, tear gas, and
other military-grade equipment as tools for dispersing peacea-
bly assembled groups?
The eviction of the New York City Occupy Movement is by
no means an isolated incident.  By 2015, militarized police
units signified the norm when responding to prolonged periods
of protest.7  In fact, police brutality spurred substantially larger
TOGETHER, https://web.archive.org/web/20130502073425/http://www.occupy
together.org/aboutoccupy/#background [http://perma.cc/6FXT-NRXM].
3 OCCUPY WALL STREET, supra note 1.
4 Brian Stetler, Occupy Wall Street Protestors Kicked Out of Zuccotti Park,
MADELINE BRAND SHOW (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.scpr.org/programs/made
leine-brand/2011/11/15/21399/occupy-wall-street-protesters-kicked-out-of/
[http://perma.cc/J59U-ZALS].
5 James Barron & Colin Moynihan, City Reopens Park After Protesters Are
Evicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/ny
region/police-begin-clearing-zuccotti-park-of-protesters.html [http://perma.cc/
6GUG-XXPS].
6 PROTEST AND ASSEMBLY RIGHTS PROJECT, SUPPRESSING PROTEST: HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. RESPONSE TO OCCUPY WALL STREET 73–82 (2012) [hereinafter
PROTEST AND ASSEMBLY RIGHTS PROJECT].
7 Pay especially close attention to the way in which police forces look.  Police
officers in Ferguson, Missouri, look like your neighborhood Robocop or SWAT
team member.  These are supposedly normal police officers. See Brian Ries,
Ferguson Police’s ‘5 Second Rule’ Is Unconstitutional, Court Finds, MASHABLE (Oct.
6, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/10/06/ferguson-5-second-rule-
unconstitutional/ [http://perma.cc/R9AL-VB4A].  These tactics hit a deeper is-
sue: the subconscious and subtle effects of police militarization.  By just looking
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protests across the country.  Following the shooting of an un-
armed black teenager, Michael Brown, by a local police officer
in Ferguson, Missouri, community members and Americans
from across the country took to the streets, the vast majority in
a peaceful manner, demanding the arrest of the police officer
for Michael Brown’s death.8  In Ferguson, police officers re-
acted with a great showing of force9 through the employment of
armored vehicles, military-grade rifles, and tactical raiding
equipment.10
menacing and overpowering, the police forces can greatly affect the manner in
which citizens act around them.  Citizens can feel less inclined to voice their
opinions simply because they are afraid of getting hurt or arrested.  The fact that
the majority of protestors in Ferguson are people of color does not help their cause
either. See Frank Roberts, A Blues Ballad for Ferguson: Where Do We Go from
Here?, VIBE (Oct. 17, 2014, 8:57 PM), http://www.vibe.com/article/blues-ballad-
ferguson-where-do-we-go-here [http://perma.cc/N5F5-KX34].  This is what con-
stitutional scholars refer to as the “chilling effect.”  This occurs when an action by
the government has the indirect effect of deterring someone from exercising his or
her First Amendment rights. See Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Prob-
lem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1474 (2013).  The Supreme Court
first introduced the word “chill” into the First Amendment vernacular in 1952.
See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The “chilling effect” soon became a widely used objection to legislation that had
the incidental effect of deterring the exercise of First Amendment Rights. See
generally Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1633, 1648 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has explicitly invoked the chilling
effect to explain defamation, obscenity, commercial speech, fraud, invasion of
privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Communist-affiliation
cases.” (footnotes omitted)).
8 See William M. Welch & Yamiche Alcindor, Judge: Ferguson Police Violated
Protesters’ Rights, USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2014, 3:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/news/2014/10/06/judge-injunction-ferguson-police/16835217/ [http:/
/perma.cc/7UVQ-Z5VT].
9 A Look Back at the Outrage in Ferguson, Missouri After Police Shooting of
18-Year-Old Michael Brown, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/violence-ferguson-missouri-michael-brown-shooting-gallery-1.1903203
[http://perma.cc/BN8C-B3R8]; Justin Baragona, St. Louis Area Police Officers
Harassing Ferguson Protestors at Places of Employment, POLITICUSUSA (Oct. 17,
2014, 2:58 PM), http://www.politicususa.com/2014/10/17/st-louis-area-police
-officers-harassing-ferguson-protesters-places-employment.html [http://
perma.cc/2NCB-4723]; Sari Horowitz, Carol D. Leonnig & Kimberly Kindy, Justice
Dept. to Probe Ferguson Police Force, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-to-probe-ferguson-po
lice-force/2014/09/03/737dd928-33bc-11e4-a723-fa3895a25d02_story.html
[http://perma.cc/X8Y4-H39A]; Josh Levs, Ferguson Violence: Critics Rip Police
Tactics, Use of Military Equipment, CNN (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/
2014/08/14/us/missouri-ferguson-police-tactics/ [http://perma.cc/Z46E-
AQTE]; Violence in Ferguson: Police Fire Tear Gas, Smoke Bombs at Demonstrators,
ABC NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014 7:05 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/violence-fergu
son-police-fire-smoke-bombs-tear-gas/story?id=24973522 [https://perma.cc/
QJ5E-N537].
10 Everett Rosenfeld, Where Ferguson’s ‘Military’ Police Get Their Gear, CNBC
(Aug. 14, 2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101920548# [http://
perma.cc/76X4-LCT9].
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Although protests dwindled in the weeks following the ini-
tial killing, protests increased steadily during the “Ferguson
October” campaign, which drew protestors from across the
country for one weekend in Ferguson.11  Police officers arrested
many peaceful protestors, including public academics such as
Cornel West, bringing much media coverage to the area.12
Community members eventually found some relief through the
courts,13 but the tension between protestors and law enforce-
ment remained.  The protestors faced many threats, such as
the fear of arrest or abusive police tactics,14 with the latter of
which including the use of dangerous weapons against protes-
tors.  Furthermore, these types of police tactics pose the threat
of having a “chilling impact” that undermines the right to
peaceably assemble by “causing individuals to reasonably per-
ceive that they cannot safely protest.”15
Militarized police responses are now a staple16 of local gov-
ernment’s response to the body politic’s exercise of its right to
11 Come to Ferguson, HANDS UP UNITED, http://www.handsupunited.org/
come-to-ferguson/ [https://perma.cc/AXR6-QYNS].
12 Brittney Cooper, Cornel West Was Right All Along: Why America Needs a
Moment of Clarity Now, SALON (Oct 15, 2014, 2:55 PM), http://www.salon.com/
2014/10/15/cornel_west_was_right_all_along_why_america_needs_a_moment_
of_clarity_now/ [http://perma.cc/X5HW-TRW3]; Knocked Down: Cornel West Ar-
rested During Ferguson Protest, NBC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2014, 3:02 PM), http://
www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting/knocked-down-cornel-
west-arrested-during-ferguson-protests-n224791 [http://perma.cc/GK6B-
BKST].
13 Mem., Order, & Prelim. Inj. at 5, Abdullah v. St. Louis, 52 F. Supp. 3d 936
(E.D. Mo. 2014) (No. 4:14CV1436 CDP).
14 Violence in Ferguson: Police Fire Tear Gas, Smoke Bombs at Demonstrators,
ABC NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014, 7:05 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/violence-fergu
son-police-fire-smoke-bombs-tear-gas/story?id=24973522; Levs, supra note 9.
15 PROTEST AND ASSEMBLY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 6, at 81. R
16 Shawn Musgrave made a Freedom of Information Act request to the states
of Ohio, California, and New York.  He asked for their 1033 inventory reports.  The
inventory report delivered, disclosed only after a very persistent Musgrave in-
sisted, was astonishing.  As of May 8, 2012, New York State acquired over 1000
pieces of equipment, including hundreds of rifles such as M-16, M-16a1, and M-
14 rifles, many armored trucks, infrared laser pointers, image enhancers, helicop-
ter pieces, night vision goggles, and various $90 pieces simply described as an
“assault pack.” 1033 MOU and Annual Inventory Form (New York), MUCKROCK,
https://www.muckrock.com/foi/new-york-16/1033-mou-and-annual-
inventory-form-new-york-13013/ [http://perma.cc/4S2N-NPD5] (Musgrave’s
1033 inventory report requests); see also Shawn Musgrave, New Data Provides
First Detailed Look at Military Gear Held by New York Law Enforcement Agencies,
N.Y. WORLD (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2014/10/14/
new-data-provides-first-detailed-look-military-gear-held-new-york-law-enforce
ment-agencies/ [http://perma.cc/E8GF-CV2A].  It would make sense for a police
department to get safety goggles, first aid kits, and helicopter pieces, which the
NYPD did acquire through the 1033 program.  However, why the NYPD is stocking
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN304.txt unknown Seq: 5 14-MAR-16 10:01
2016] THE DISMANTLING OF DISSENT 781
peaceably assemble.17  In the wake of Michael Brown’s death,
the death of another unarmed black male at the hands of police
officers made national headlines.  NYPD officers choked and
killed Eric Garner on the streets of Staten Island, New York.18
A tremendous outpouring of exasperation,19 indignation, and
nationwide protest occurred before and subsequent to the
grand jury’s decision not to indict the police officers involved.20
As a result of the continuing protests and in anticipation of
more protests, militarized police forces quickly deployed.  At
the time of this writing, the death of unarmed citizens at the
hands of police officers and the deployment of militarized police
forces are commonplace,21 especially in the context of gather-
ings of people of color.22
However, there has been little public discussion on the
impacts of the militarization of local police forces and how the
police’s increasingly violent response to acts of protest may
encroach on the protective intention of the right to peaceably
assemble.  The true meaning of the Assembly Clause has van-
ished from the American consciousness, and the manner in
up on equipment as if they were defending against the Tet Offensive is a different
story.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18 Press Release, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, LatinoJustice PRLDEF Calls on De-
partment of Justice to Investigate the Killing of Eric Garner (Dec. 3, 2014), http://
latinojustice.org/briefing_room/press_releases/latinojustice_prldef_calls_on_de
partment_of_justice_to_investigate_the_killing_of_eric_garner/ [https://perma
.cc/K9L7-MA57].
19 See e.g., id.
20 See Peter Holley, Eric Garner’s Family Thanks Protesters as Nationwide
Demonstrations Continue, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/12/06/for-the-third-night-in-a-row-
protesters-across-the-country-rally-against-police-involved-deaths/ [https://
perma.cc/ZMD3-SS22].
21 See Levs, supra note 9 (“American policing has become unnecessarily and
dangerously militarized, in large part through federal programs that have armed
state and local law enforcement agencies with the weapons and tactics of war,
with almost no public discussion or oversight.” (quoting AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING 2 (2014),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-
web-rel1.pdf [http://perma.cc/PC6G-6YQF]).
22 During the premiere of the movie Straight Outta Compton in August 2015—
a powerful biopic about the groundbreaking hip-hop group NWA—the Los Angeles
Police Department sent police officers on patrol to movie theaters.  It appears that
even congregating at movie theaters triggers police activity. See, e.g., Dennis
Romero, LAPD Beefs Up Patrols for Straight Outta Compton Premiere, L.A. WEEKLY
(Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.laweekly.com/news/lapd-beefs-up-patrols-for-
straight-outta-compton-premiere-5901273 [http://perma.cc/9RTS-AG6K].
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which militarized police forces quash protests is evident of that
deteriorated vision.23
This Note argues that the ritualized use of extreme police
force on peacefully assembled groups is a violation of the As-
sembly Clause as it was originally intended to function.  Part I
gives a general account of the Assembly Clause, its creation,
and its original intention to safeguard minority views.  Part II
recounts part of the history behind the militarization of police
forces.  Part III suggests a balancing test the courts should use
when evaluating violations of the freedom to peaceably assem-
ble in order to conform to the original meaning of the First
Amendment.
I
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE DEATH OF ASSEMBLY
Navigating the waters of the Assembly Clause is no easy
task.  As Professor George P. Smith II astutely points out, “[t]he
protection of the public peace must be carefully reconciled with
the conflicting interests of allowing free expression of ideas in
public places.”24  Thus, the balance between public peace and
free expression necessitates peaceful assembly.  The right to
peaceably assemble is a powerful tool and formed the basis of
the greatest social movements in our country.25  In fact, it is
impossible to create a movement without assembly.26  For ex-
23 As Supreme Court cases portray, the courts lost sight of the original con-
cept of the Assembly Clause long before recent uprisings. See infra subpart I.B.
This deteriorated memory within the courts projects onto police use of force when
quashing protests.  In 1999, for example, Seattle police violently quashed protests
at the World Trade Organization meeting.  The ACLU pegged the police responses
as “flawed” and the Seattle police department noted flaws in their procedures.  If
the Assembly Clause is understood within the context of the original understand-
ing, and if the original understanding of what a police force represents is what it is
supposed to do, these forceful actions by police forces may be prevented. See
ACLU OF WASHINGTON, OUT OF CONTROL: SEATTLE’S FLAWED RESPONSE TO PROTESTS
AGAINST THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 5–10 (June 2000); see also THE SEATTLE
POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT AFTER ACTION REPORT 3–9
(2000).
24 George P. Smith II, The Development of the Right of Assembly—A Current
Socio-Legal Investigation, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 359, 377 (1967).
25 See Linda J. Lumsden, Women and Freedom of Expression Before the
Twentieth Century, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION: ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 195, 195–97 (Margaret M.
Russell ed., 2010).
26 The rise of the digital age poses an interesting argument for parallels to
physical assembly.  The act of “hactivism” sees groups of people gathering in
digital space and may mean that they are not in fact “assembled” in the traditional
sense.  However, an assembly is essentially a conduit through which persons
coalesce.  Thus, the digital space simply provides another conduit through which
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ample, the right to assembly was at the heart of the women’s
suffrage movement.  There is a substantial probability that
“American women would not have the vote today if their prede-
cessors had not taken to the streets.”27  Without the right to
peaceably assemble, women would not have been able to chal-
lenge beliefs about how women should behave or take “to the
streets to speak, march, and picket.”28
During the fight for women’s suffrage, women faced many
incredible obstacles.  Today, however, protestors who assemble
for a cause often face a police force that resembles an army.
The common comparison between police departments and our
nation’s army is extremely interesting because the Framers
intended the separation of a civil police force and a standing
army.29  If history is of any use—indeed, it is of utmost impor-
tance—it tells us that our founders were extremely wary of a
standing army.30  This fear led to the passage of the Posse
Comitatus Act, which effectively banned the use of the Army of
the United States to execute laws except when it is expressly
authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress.31  Despite
the Act’s explicit prohibition of using federal armed forces for
the execution of laws, it is hardly free of loopholes in practice,
such as the use of military equipment by local police for the
enforcement of laws.  States also resorted to the use of their
national guards as a way to circumvent the Act.32  Although
federal armed forces cannot enforce state laws, state national
guards and police departments with federal military equipment
can.
A. Right to Assembly: The Roots
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
persons assemble and, I suspect, poses no threat to the traditional notion of an
assembly.
27 Lumsden, supra note 25, at 195. R
28 Id. at 196.
29 RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP 15–16 (2013) (“Taken together, the
Third, Second, and Tenth Amendments indicate the Founders’ desire for the
power to enforce laws and maintain order to be primarily left with the states. . . . .
Ultimately, the Founders decided that a standing army was a necessary evil, but
that the role of soldiers would be only to dispel foreign threats, not to enforce laws
against American citizens.”).
30 Id. at 12–13 (noting that the Framers instituted the Third Amendment as a
safeguard against standing armies since standing armies pose a great threat to
free societies).
31 Army Appropriations Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012)).
32 See BALKO, supra note 29, at 35–36. R
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exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”33  From
one perspective, the Amendment as a whole was a reaction to
English colonial restrictions and suppression of speech and of
the press.34  The First Amendment “was meant to prohibit li-
censing of publication such as existed in England and to forbid
punishment for seditious libel.”35  Prosecutions of writers and
publishers in the colonial United States occurred often,36 and
many focused on seditious libel, at times for criticizing local
government.37  However, the First Amendment also served an-
other purpose: the preservation of the “obvious” right to assem-
ble.38  Although First Amendment protections were a reaction
to British colonial suppression, and although the intent of Con-
gress in passing the First Amendment is not at all clear given
scarce legislative history,39 the First Amendment was a “con-
servatory” amendment, meant to safeguard the understanding
33 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
34 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 966–67
(5th ed. 2015).  Chemerinsky goes on to note that ensuring protection of the press
might have been all that the First Amendment was meant to do. Id. at 966 n.2
(noting that in Patterson v. Colorado, the Court clarified that “the main purpose of
such constitutional provisions is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon
publications as had been practiced by other governments’” (quoting 205 U.S. 454,
462 (1907))).
35 Id. at 952.  Here, Professor Chemerinsky does not include the Religion
Clause because he deals with religion in a separate section within the text.
36 Erwin Chemerinsky gives a plethora of reasons for why speech was pro-
tected following independence from England.  These reasons include the fact that
speech is essential in a democracy based on self-governance, that freedom of
speech is essential in “discovering truth,” that freedom of speech is an essential
aspect of personhood and autonomy, and that freedom of speech promotes toler-
ance. See id. at 969–74.
37 Id. at 967.
38 Baylen J. Linnekin, “Tavern Talk” and the Origins of the Assembly Clause:
Tracing the First Amendment’s Assembly Clause Back to Its Roots in Colonial
Taverns, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593, 611 (2012) (describing Massachusetts
Representative Theodore Sedgwick’s opinion that there should not be an inclusion
of a right to assembly in a constitutional amendment because the right “would be
too obvious as to warrant mention”); see also M. GLENN ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF
ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 12 (2d ed. 1981) (quoting Representative Sedgwick in
his belief that the right to assembly “is a self-evident, unalienable [sic] right which
the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would be called in question”
(alteration in original) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS 759–61 (1789))).
39 ABERNATHY, supra note 38, at 11; see also Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of R
Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the
Right, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION: ITS CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 32, 34 (Margaret M. Russell ed.,
2010) (describing the Assembly Clause’s history as “ambiguous”).
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that citizens wanted their right to assembly protected.40  Al-
though legal scholarship on the freedom of religion and speech
is plentiful,41 the right to peaceably assemble does not have an
extensive legal history.  In fact, the right seems “forgotten”;42
indeed, Professor John D. Inazu argues that the right has been
displaced by the fiction of the “freedom of association.”43
Though Congress had a relatively short debate before passing
the Bill of Rights, scholars conserved the general history be-
hind the Assembly Clause.44
Records of the House debate of any of the amendments are
scarce.45  However, the philosophical underpinnings—and the
little surviving legislative history—inform the intention of the
right to assemble.  Scholarship suggests that the Framers of
the Constitution applied their Enlightenment Era philosophies
concerning “open inquiry and the search for truth” when they
drafted the Constitution.46  This influencing philosophy led to
their emphasis on safeguarding dissenting opinions47 and
40 ABERNATHY, supra note 38, at 11–12 (referring to Justice Thomas Cooley’s R
statements that the Bill of Rights is a “conservatory instrument[ ] rather than
reformatory” (quoting Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 214 (1874))).
41 Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV.
543, 547 (2009) (“Major treatises on constitutional and First Amendment law
barely mention the right of assembly.”).
42 See John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV.
565, 570 (2010) [hereinafter Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly].
43 Id. at 565–68; see also infra subpart II.B; cf. Melvin Rische, Freedom of
Assembly, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 317, 331–32 (1965) (suggesting that the freedom of
association is merely “another facet” of the freedom of assembly meant to protect
groups that are controversial in nature).  Rische’s argument, although under-
standable, is not convincing because the purpose of the Assembly Clause in the
first place was the protection of minority and dissenting groups.  Some of these
groups would necessarily be “controversial” because they are counter-
majoritarian.
44 ABERNATHY, supra note 38, at 11 (“The framers of the Constitution appar- R
ently spent little time in considering a bill of rights.”).
45 Linnekin, supra note 38. R
46 JOEL M. GORA ET AL., THE RIGHT TO PROTEST 3 (1991). Thomas I. Emerson
suggests that the freedom of expression, seen as a whole, in a democratic society
rests upon four premises: the freedom of expression is (1) essential as a means of
assuring self-fulfillment; (2) an essential process of advancing knowledge and
discovering truth; (3) essential to provide for participation in decision making by
all members of society; and (4) a method of achieving a more adaptable and stable
community, especially maintaining the “precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus.” THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1971).  Thus, the Enlightenment Era ideals of truth seeking
and reflective discourse survived from the enactment of the Constitution to 1971.
47 It is very interesting to see the complete opposite happening in the late
twentieth century.  As Balko points out, “progressives have been advocating for
the use of more government force against political factions they find unsavory.”
BALKO, supra note 29, at 298. R
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counter-majoritarian views within the First Amendment.48
Following the ratification of the Constitution and the uproar by
the new states of the Union and Antifederalists for a bill of
rights,49 the Framers heeded the call and penned protections
for dissenters and chauvinists alike through the First
Amendment.50
The freedom to peaceably assemble is one of the most com-
monly practiced actions enumerated in the Bill of Rights.51
The communication of ideas, social gatherings, and simple “off
the cuff” interactions and coalescing occur within the frame-
work of assembly.  In fact, it is rather difficult to avoid assem-
bling.  The act of assembly was so widespread and simple to
achieve that an assembly was often thought of as any time
more than three people got together in public52 or a variation of
that sort.  In early colonial times, assemblies occurred within
churches, group clubs,53 public parks, and taverns.54  The tav-
ern was an especially central locale in the history of the right to
peaceably assemble; local taverns served “as the most common
drinking and gathering place for colonists.”55  However, taverns
served a broader purpose than inebriating the local residents.
Taverns “were used for nearly every public purpose, including
‘council and assembly meetings, social gatherings, merchants’
associations, preaching, [and] the acting of plays.’”56  Thus, the
tavern was a special place within the colonial cities and
towns.57  In fact, the tavern was so central to colonial organiz-
ing that, following the French and Indian War, when Britain
tried recovering from its economic losses at the cost of the
colonies, groups of colonists assembled in taverns to discuss
48 GORA ET AL., supra note 46, at 3. R
49 ABERNATHY, supra note 38, at 11. R
50 See id.
51 Linnekin, supra note 38, at 593. R
52 ABERNATHY, supra note 38, at 22 (citing an old English case, Field v. Re- R
ceiver of Met. Police, [1907] 2 K.B. 853, 860 (Eng.)) (noting that it takes at least
three people to form an assembly under the law of riots). Wharton’s Criminal Law
definition mirrored the old English rule. Id. at 27.  The British understanding of
when an assembly turned into a riot was entrenched within the early colonial and
American understanding.
53 Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 642 (2002)
(describing how women in the 1635 Massachusetts Bay Colony used the ships
they were on, their homes, and church, as a place to gather and discuss the
weekly sermons the women heard).
54 Linnekin, supra note 38, at 595. R
55 Id.
56 Id. at 596 (alteration in original) (quoting CHARLES M. ANDREWS, COLONIAL
FOLKWAYS 109 (1919)).
57 Id. at 595–96 (“[T]hese establishments . . . existed from the southernmost
to the northernmost colonies . . . .”).
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their grievances.58  These meetings ranged from informal to
formal assemblies where colonists organized boycotts, shared
news, discussed politics, and even plotted the Revolution.59
These taverns, Baylen Linnekin suggests, played three es-
pecially key roles in forming the idea of the right to assembly.
The taverns provided a place for informal talk, served as the
primary news source in the colonies, and permitted participa-
tion from people in all social classes.60  Thus, the tavern pro-
vided the space for the most basic expression of the right to
assembly: a body of people meeting for the fair exchange and
expression of ideas.  As Linniken suggests, “[a]ssembling is
both an act and a natural human tendency.”61  The tavern was
the most basic manifestation of this human tendency—one
that the new Union sought to conserve.  Furthermore, taverns
provided an opportunity for open assembly—simple unions of
citizens without the fear of repercussions or consequence—a
necessary condition for successful movements and sociopoliti-
cal change.62  Therefore, the right to peaceably assemble acts
as a tool: the “freedom of assembly is what checks government
attacks on the right itself.”63
The right of assembly was not just about the coalescing of
different socioeconomic classes for the discussion of ideas and
the planning of boycotts.  The right of assembly was also an
unlimited64 conduit through which those assembled could crit-
ically reflect on their perceptions of reality and reach an end
goal.  It was, at times, an extremely intellectual endeavor in
which all were welcome to participate.  A strong indication of
this unlimited right lies in the history of the First Amendment.
When Congress convened to draft amendments to the
58 Id. at 598–99.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 599–604.
61 Id. at 619.
62 Id. at 622–23.
63 Id. at 627.
64 I use the word “unlimited” to call attention to the fact that the Framers
consciously chose to rid the Clause of any limitations, namely, the right to assem-
ble in order to petition.  Furthermore, the right is unlimited in the sense that the
actual assembly’s composition has almost infinite permutations.  However, the
clause was limited by its own language (“peaceably” to assemble) and common-
law limitations, such as antiriot laws.  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted,
[a]ll rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical ex-
treme.  Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of
policy which are other than those on which the particular right is
founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a
certain point is reached.
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
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Constitution, Virginia and North Carolina proposed a version of
the First Amendment that provided for the people to “have a
right peaceably to assemble together to consult for the common
good.”65  Professor Inazu suggests that the most important as-
pect of the Assembly Clause that the convention eventually
passed is the deletion of the three words “the common good.”
Inazu suggests that even though Virginia, North Carolina, New
York, and Rhode Island proposed the use of the term “the com-
mon good” in reference to the right to peaceably assemble, the
rejection of the phrase by Congress “signaled the possibility
that the interests of the people assembled need not be cotermi-
nous with the interests of those in power.”66  In this manner,
Congress safeguarded the right of assembly by conserving it as
a means of protest or dissent and not limiting its purpose.67
A second textual note that Inazu calls to attention is the
bifurcation of the right to assembly and petition in the First
Amendment.  He notes that after the striking of “the common
good” language from the Amendment, it was “ambiguous
whether the Amendment recognized a single right to assemble
for the purpose of petitioning the government or whether it
established both an unencumbered right of assembly and a
separate right of petition.”68  From a textual analysis, the
comma preceding the phrase “and to petition” appears to “be
residual from the earlier text [the common good]” and thus acts
as a separation between “assemble” and “petition” within the
clause.69  However, this textual analysis might not even be nec-
essary given the fact that, during the House debates over the
language of the Amendment, the representatives envisioned a
“broader notion of assembly.”70  Inazu refers to the pointed
exchange between Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts and
John Page of Virginia during the House debates.  Sedgwick
believed that the right to assembly was too obvious and “self-
evident” to merit inclusion in the Bill of Rights.71  Page, how-
65 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS
228 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
66 Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra note 42, at 572. R
67 Id.
68 Id. at 573.  Professor Smith points out the similar separation of the right to
petition and to peaceably assemble. See Smith II, supra note 24, at 366.  How- R
ever, he did so by looking at the Supreme Court in De Jonge v. Oregon, 288 U.S.
364–65 (1937) (“The [right to peaceably assemble is] cognate to those of free
speech and free press and is equally fundamental.”).
69 Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra note 42, at 574. R
70 Id.
71 JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 24
(2012) [hereinafter INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE].
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ever, responded by noting that “people have also been pre-
vented from assembling together on their lawful occasions,
therefore it is well to guard against such stretches of author-
ity.”72  In the same exchange, Page referenced an incident that
occurred in 1670 in which William Penn, a Quaker, attempted
to worship with his congregation in their meeting house.  A new
local law prohibited “nonconformist” worship in London.  Thus,
Penn took to the streets and held a religious meeting on a
public street.  The authorities arrested Penn and tried him for
unlawful assembly.  This act of assembly as a form of protest
garnered significant attention and praise in the colonial United
States.73  Thus, the “allusion to Penn made clear that the right
of assembly under discussion in the House encompassed more
than meeting to petition for a redress of grievances.”74  Penn’s
gathering was not explicitly an act of petition.  Thus, the “text
handed down to us . . . conveys a broad notion of assembly.”75
Under Inazu’s analysis,76 the Assembly Clause was inten-
tionally not limited to the “common good,” thus conserving mi-
nority and dissenting voices.  Furthermore, the Assembly
Clause does not limit assembly to the purposes of petitioning
the government.  The right of assembly, as envisioned in the
House debates and by the crafters of the Clause, is an over-
arching and broad protection of the sanctity that citizens have
to form groups and ideas and to present them in a peaceable
manner.77
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 25; see Timothy Zick, Recovering the Assembly Clause, Liberty’s
Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 91 TEX. L. REV. 375, 383–85 (2012)
(book review) (describing Inazu’s approach as “both eclectic and atomistic”).  Zick
argues that through an atomistic approach, Inazu isolates the Assembly Clause,
which robs the analysis of an approach that views the First Amendment as four
interrelated, protected freedoms. Cf. John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the
Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787 (2014).  Inazu argues that twenti-
eth-century jurists and politicians alike understood the Assembly Clause, along
with its First Amendment companion clauses, both in isolation and as a single
amendment.  They were interwoven but distinct. Id. at 789, 852.
75 INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE, supra note 71, at 25. R
76 For a surgical, word-by-word analysis of the Assembly Clause, reaching the
same conclusion as Inazu, see Nicholas S. Brod, Note, Rethinking a Reinvigorated
Right to Assemble, 63 DUKE L.J. 155, 163–69 (2013).
77 Inazu explores the first attempt of a large dissenting voice to peaceably
assemble during the late eighteenth century.  “Democratic-Republican Societies”
sprang up all throughout the Union.  These societies were places where citizens
assembled “to discuss with firmness and freedom all subjects of public concern.”
In essence, these were societies that critically reflected and attacked the govern-
ment through discourse.  Ironically, Sedgwick—who noted that the right to as-
sembly was “self-evident” during the House debates—played a part in the
formation of a large public opinion, also led by George Washington, which led to
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B. Right to Assembly: The Judicial Evolution
Although not restricted in the text of the Constitution be-
yond the word “peaceable,” in practice, the right to peaceably
assemble is not absolute.  The judicial branch functions as a
safeguard of the First Amendment, and “with the operation of
judicial review, the guarantee of freedom of assembly is more
than just a pious hope—it represents a legal barrier, judicially
enforceable, to excess of legislative and administrative ac-
tion.”78  However, the right to peaceable assembly is open to
legislative curtailment: in essence, the right functions within
the parameters of its “unrestricted” origins, but it is not abso-
lute because it is subject to subsequent legislative curtailments
by Congress.79
Generally, the right to peaceably assemble is guaranteed in
public spaces.80  The traditional public forum “consists of
places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate, such as streets81 and
parks.”82  Furthermore, “public streets and sidewalks may be
used for public assembly and debate.”83  In terms of private
spaces, it should be noted from the onset that “[s]tate constitu-
tions may provide broader or more expansive speech rights
with respect to private property than the Federal
Constitution.”84
The Supreme Court of the United States recognizes that
the right to peaceably assemble is “among the most precious of
the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.”85  The right is
“not confined to verbal expression.  [It] embrace[s] appropriate
types of action which certainly include the right in a peaceable
annihilation of these societies. See INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE, supra note 71, at R
26–29.
78 ABERNATHY, supra note 38, at 13. R
79 Id. at 30.
80 See generally John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s Public Forum, 56 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1159, 1172–83 (2015) (describing the traditionally liberal use of
public forums, such as parks and streets, for demonstrations and assemblies,
and arguing that the meaning and use of the public forum has slowly decayed
from its original use due to the shift in the public forum doctrine from its tradi-
tional Assembly Clause analysis to Speech Clause analysis).
81 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (recognizing the right to
peaceably assemble in streets).
82 628 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 559 (2014).
83 Id.
84 Id. (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Albert-
son’s, Inc. v. Young, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106 (3d Dist. 2003); United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 919 v. Crystal Mall Assocs., L.P., 270 Conn.
261 (2004)).
85 United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
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and orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful pres-
ence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be, the
unconstitutional segregation of public facilities.”86  For the
purposes of this Note, I only refer to the federally guaranteed
right to peaceably assemble, a right that extends to the states
through its incorporation via the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1937.87
As a result of legislative curtailments enforced by the
courts, the absolute right to peaceably assemble does not exist
in all locations.88  Nevertheless, “[t]he power of a state to
abridge freedom of speech and of assembly is the exception
rather than the rule and the penalizing even of utterances of a
defined character must find its justification in a reasonable
apprehension of danger to organized government.”89  The
Supreme Court also makes clear that “[n]o one would have the
hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech
sanctions incitement to riot.”90
Like most areas of American law, Assembly Clause juris-
prudence shares a history with British jurisprudence.91  How-
ever, its present nature has long departed from the British
jurisprudential meaning of assembly and the Framers’ concep-
86 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966).
87 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
88 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976); see also Knight v. Anderson, 480
F.2d 8, 10 (9th Cir. 1973).
89 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937); see also Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (“Accordingly, we are here confronted with a
statute which, by its own words and as applied, purports to punish mere advo-
cacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely
to advocate the described type of action.  Such a statute falls within the condem-
nation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”). Brandenburg is especially
illustrative of First Amendment protections and shows the lengths to which the
Court protects them.  In that case, the Court protected a Ku Klux Klan leader from
an Ohio law which forbade “voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal
syndicalism.” Id. at 445 (alteration in original) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.13 (repealed 1974)).
90 Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 18 U.S. 175, 180 (1968)
(alteration in original) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308
(1940)).
91 See ABERNATHY, supra note 38, at 19–40 (describing the shared jurispru- R
dential history between U.S. legislative curtailments of assembly and British
ones); see also Smith II, supra note 24, at 361–66 (describing the development of R
the right of assembly in England).  Interestingly, in 1844, the only major differ-
ence between British and American freedom to peaceably assemble was that
“[p]ermission and sanction by public authorities [was] not necessary in the United
States.”  Abu El-Haj, supra note 41, at 567.  However, even in 1844, a measure
was thought to be justified “if reasonable grounds exist for apprehending a distur-
bance.” Id. at 567–68 (quoting Riots, Routs, and Unlawful Assemblies, 3 AM. L.
MAG. 350, 364 (1844)).
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tion.  This transition began when the Supreme Court set the
stage for early Assembly Clause litigation in the seminal case
United States v. Cruikshank.92  In this case, the Court dis-
missed an indictment against individuals who allegedly con-
spired to hinder certain people from peaceably assembling.
The Court found that the general right to hold a lawful meeting
rested in the hands of the States.  Thus, a grievance against
citizens could not be brought under the federal law at issue.93
The holding stated that “private citizens could not be prose-
cuted for denying the First Amendment’s freedom of assembly
to other citizens.”94  However, Chief Justice Waite’s dictum95
“could be erroneously construed as limiting assembly to the
purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances.”96
The decision in Cruikshank led to the only case in which the
Supreme Court expressly limited the Assembly Clause to peti-
tioning: Presser v. Illinois.97
However, the decision in Presser did not persist after the
body politic claimed the broader purpose of the Assembly
Clause envisioned by the Framers of the First Amendment
through mobilization and litigation.98  In fact, the early twenti-
eth century saw a rise in the use and power of the Assembly
Clause.  The use of the Assembly Clause empowered the wo-
men’s suffrage movement in the early twentieth century by
92 92 U.S. 542 (1876).  The Cruikshank decision led to a separation between
the state and federal rights to peaceably assemble.  Prior to incorporation of the
Assembly Clause, the States could vastly limit the right of their citizens to peacea-
bly assemble. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 46–48 (1897) (upholding
an ordinance that required the issuance of a permit by the Mayor of Boston before
persons could address a public assembly upon public property because the State
had control over the property much like a person controls their own private
property).  Post incorporation, these types of limitations through state legislatures
were restricted by the Supreme Court. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).  However, permit requirements for
the use of public property are now generally permissible under the time, place,
and manner test.
93 The federal law at issue in this case was the Enforcement Act of May 31,
1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140–46.
94 Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra note 42, at 589.  It R
should be noted that this case occurred before the incorporation of the Assembly
Clause through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
95 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552 (discussing “[t]he right of the people peaceably
to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances”).
96 Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra note 42, at 589. R
97 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886).  Inazu further notes that this ruling contami-
nated the reasoning behind decades of Assembly Clause scholarship.  Inazu, The
Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra note 42, at 590. R
98 See Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra note 42, at 590 n.124 R
(citing both judicial decisions and public action that contributed to the expansion
of the Assembly Clause).
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providing the constitutional protections to gather, deliberate,
plan, and act through massive, peaceful demonstrations.99
The Assembly Clause was also crucial in the successes of the
Civil Rights Movement.100  The right to—and tradition of—
peaceable assembly allowed groups to coalesce, exchange
ideas, and eventually express those ideas through peaceful
marches and silent demonstrations.  These advances owed
their success to the “growing importance of assembly in politi-
cal and legal discourse during the 1920s.”101  Justice Brandeis
articulated this notion as follows:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties;
and that in its government the deliberative forces should pre-
vail over the arbitrary.  They valued liberty both as an end
and as a means.  They believed liberty to be the secret of
happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.  They be-
lieved that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discus-
sion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordi-
narily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and
that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.  They recognized the risks to which all human
institutions are subject.  But they knew that order cannot be
secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction;
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagi-
nation; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting rem-
edy for evil counsels is good ones.102
These words by Justice Brandeis encapsulate the perception of
the right to assembly during the 1920s and well into the post-
World War II era.
99 Id. at 591–92.
100 Id. at 592–93.  It should be noted that I am not taking the “long movement”
approach, which characterizes the civil rights movement chronologically from the
Reconstruction Era into the 1960s.  Here, I refer to the time period within the long
Civil Rights Movement contained within the 1950s and 1960s.  I do not mean to
minimize or simplify the long movement, but rather to simply call attention to
those two decades.
101 Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra note 42, at 596. R
102 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
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American jurisprudence generally looked at the right to
peaceably assemble through a protective lens.  The courts
tended to first examine an act of assembly and then seemingly
retroactively decide103 whether or not that assembly was un-
lawful.  Even at the end of World War II, in 1945, the Supreme
Court held that legislative restrictions on assemblies, such as
obtaining a permit to speak in front of a crowd, could only be
justified under the “clear and present danger” standard.104  In
Thomas v. Collins, the Supreme Court of Texas upheld Collins’s
commitment for contempt of a temporary restraining order.
The restraining order restrained Thomas, while he remained in
Texas, from soliciting membership in labor unions and in other
groups affiliated with industrial organizations without first ob-
taining an organizer’s card from the local government.105  After
Texas issued the restraining order, Thomas addressed a mass
meeting of workers and asked those at the meeting to join a
union.  As a result, a local court held Thomas in contempt of
the restraining order, and the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed
the conviction.106  The Supreme Court of the United States,
however, had a different opinion.  The Court viewed the re-
quirement of acquiring an organizer’s card as an unnecessary
restriction.
Writing for the majority, Justice Rutledge rejected the
state’s argument of applying rational basis review to the orga-
nizer’s card requirement,107 and he instead opted for applying
the clear and present danger standard.  The Court clarified that
any restriction on a citizen’s liberty under the First Amendment
must be justified by “clear public interest, threatened not
doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger.”108
Furthermore, there must be a stronger connection between the
law and “the evil to be curbed” than a merely rational connec-
tion that otherwise “might support legislation against attack on
due process grounds.”109  The Court further noted that First
Amendment rights “rest on firmer foundation.  Accordingly,
whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and per-
suasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear sup-
103 Abu El-Haj, supra note 41, at 562 (“The law could intervene only after an R
assembly had gathered if through its behavior it could be charged with unlawful
assembly, riot, or breach of the peace.”).
104 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 527–28 (1945).
105 Id. at 518.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 527 (“In short, the State would apply a ‘rational basis’ test . . . .”).
108 Id. at 530.
109 Id.
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port in public danger, actual or impending.”110  In Thomas, the
organization’s card requirement did not meet the clear and
present danger standard precisely because Thomas merely at-
tempted to exercise his right to assemble and solicit member-
ship at an appropriate time and place.111
As a natural progression of the “peaceable” restriction in
the text of the Assembly Clause, the federal government and
many states had already recognized the right to stop any “riot-
ous” assemblies.112  Regardless of this natural bar, the Assem-
bly Clause analysis remained holistic.  In 1961, when
analyzing a restriction that forced public registration of mem-
bers of certain political parties, the Court applied a protective
balancing test, by which it balanced the harm of an assembly
to the public against the infringement of an individual’s
right.113 In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, the Court reviewed a law that required the Communist
Party of the United States to register as a Communist-action
organization.114  The term “Communist-action organization”
under the Subversive Activities Control Act (Control Act) meant
that the organization was substantially directed or controlled
by a foreign government or organization that controlled the
“world Communist movement.”115  At question in the case was
whether the United States Communist Party was under the
control of a foreign government controlling the world Commu-
nist movement and whether the registration requirement vio-
lated the First Amendment.116
After finding that the Communist Party satisfied the defini-
tion within the Control Act, the Court turned to the issue of the
First Amendment.  The Court applied a balancing test that be-
gan with a “rational relation” analysis.117  The Communist
Party argued that the registration requirement was an uncon-
stitutional bill of attainder that made it impossible to register
anyone in the party due to the consequences of any affiliation
110 Id.
111 Id. at 533–34.
112 See Abu El-Haj, supra note 41, at 567–68. R
113 See Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 90–91 (1961) (balancing the harms that the state saw and the individual’s
right to assemble under the Communist Party).  It should be noted that even in
this case, the Court uses the freedom of association and freedom to peaceably
assemble almost interchangeably and dilutes the original meaning of the clause.
See id.
114 Id. at 4.
115 Id. at 8.
116 Id. at 35, 70.
117 See id. at 92.
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with the party.118  The Court noted that “only the clearest proof
could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on
such a ground.”119  Furthermore, the Court noted that the con-
sequences of registration, when weighed in the constitutional
balance, were not devoid of rational relation to the purpose of
the Control Act.120  Thus, the Court found that without com-
pelling evidence of an intent to bar registration, coupled with a
rational relation to the overall purpose of the Control Act, the
section of the Control Act in question defeated part of the Com-
munist Party’s primary constitutional claim.  This passage also
made clear that one piece of the “constitutional balance” re-
quires a “rational relation” between a section of the law and its
overall purpose.  The Court then moved on to balance the right
of “[f]reedoms of [e]xpression,” which Justice Frankfurter used
interchangeably with the assembly clause language, on the
other side of the scale.121  In this part of the balance, the Court
cited to Thomas v. Collins and noted that Thomas stood for the
proposition that registration before the “exercise of liberties
protected by the First Amendment” is simply part of the balanc-
ing test but is not dispositive.122  Although the Communist
Party eventually lost in the balancing test because of the risk
their organization posed to national security coupled with the
rational relation test,123 the Court made clear that a law con-
cerning the Assembly Clause must pass a “constitutional bal-
ance” that weighs the rational relation of the legislation against
the cost of implementing the citizen’s right.124
The Court also applied a “purpose test” in determining
whether an assembly is protected by the First Amendment.  In
De Jonge v. Oregon,125 the Court looked at the purpose of an
assembly when deciding whether or not defendant De Jonge’s
conviction for attending a meeting under the auspices of the
Communist Party violated the First Amendment.  The Supreme
Court of Oregon upheld De Jonge’s conviction under the Crimi-
nal Syndicalism Law of Oregon.126  The law defined “criminal
syndicalism” as “the doctrine which advocates crime, physical
violence, sabotage or any unlawful acts or methods as a means
118 Id. at 79, 82.
119 Id. at 83 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 88.
122 Id. at 90 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)).
123 Id. at 103.
124 Id. at 90.
125 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
126 Id. at 356–58.
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of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or
revolution.”127  The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the
Communist Party was an advocate of criminal syndicalism;
thus, De Jonge’s participation by attending a meeting violated
the law.128  The Supreme Court of the United States reversed
the conviction, noting that when reviewing the right to peacea-
bly assemble, a court must look “to [the assembly’s] pur-
pose.”129  In this case, the purpose of the assembly was not
unlawful because its purpose was informative.  Those assem-
bling wanted to discuss and exchange ideas; therefore, their
actions were well within the protections of the Assembly
Clause.130
Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, noted that “peace-
able assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime.
The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be
proscribed.  Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings
cannot be branded as criminals on that score.”131  Justice
Hughes also pointed out that if local governments think that
those in the meetings planned on committing crimes either
during the meeting or afterward, the law provides for other
forms of prosecution: conspiracies.132  Thus, if governments
are concerned with the subject matter of assemblies, they
should not try to disassemble the assembly because meetings
themselves are not illegal.  The government should go after the
alleged illegal agreements through conspiracy law.133
By the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court had a
stable Assembly Clause jurisprudence.  The Court began to
dismantle the otherwise strong and established Assembly
Clause during the Red Scare.134  The first explicit recognition of
127 Id. at 357.
128 Id. at 357–58.
129 Id. at 365.
130 Id. at 365–66.
131 Id. at 365.
132 Id.
133 In fact, it appears that the federal government eventually dismantled dis-
sent through the use of the Seditious Conspiracy law, 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (2012),
when it charged and convicted Puerto Rican revolutionaries, notably the currently
incarcerated Oscar Lopez Rivera, in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  William
Crawford, FALN Leader Convicted, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 1981, at S1.
134 As Inazu explains, the “four freedoms” of the First Amendment were almost
sacred.  They merited celebrations at the New York World’s Fair, and even New
York Mayor Fiorello la Guardia called a group of four statues embodying the four
freedoms the “heart of the fair.”  Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra
note 42, at 601–03.  However, this romantic view of the Assembly Clause started R
fading when President Roosevelt presented his “four essential human freedoms”
and included all the First Amendment protections except for the right to peacea-
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a “right of association” (the phrase that courts eventually re-
placed for the assembly clause language) occurred in the 1958
Supreme Court decision NAACP v. Alabama.135  In NAACP, the
Court entertained another case dealing with publicly listed
names of members of an organization.  In this case, Alabama
required any foreign corporation to publically list its mem-
bers.136  Justice Harlan “could have grounded his decision in
the freedom of assembly.  But he instead shifted away from
assembly . . . .”137  Justice Harlan based his decision on the
“freedom to engage in association for the advancement of be-
liefs,”138 and held that this right of association protected the
NAACP member list.  Soon thereafter, the focal point of First
Amendment litigation was around the freedom of association
rather than the freedom of assembly.  By the 1960s, the Court
narrowly construed the Assembly Clause to encompass public
gatherings like protests and demonstrations.139  Justice White
put the final nail in the coffin140 in Perry Education Ass’n v.
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n when he applied the free speech141
standard of scrutiny in a freedom of assembly case.142  In
Perry, the Court looked at whether the First Amendment is
bly assemble and the right to petition.  Thus, even from a public policy perspec-
tive, the Assembly Clause started, slowly, to be “forgotten.” Id. at 603.
135 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
136 Id. at  451.
137 Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra note 42, at 609. R
138 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460.
139 See Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra note 42, at 610. R
140 Following the Perry decision, the Supreme Court has not addressed a
freedom of assembly claim in over thirty years. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE, supra
note 71, at 62. R
141 Abu El-Haj, supra note 41, at 585 (“[A]ssembly cases are framed as cases R
involving free expression and analyzed within a doctrinal framework developed to
address all aspects of the individual right of free expression.”).
142 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983) (“For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion, it must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.  The State may also enforce regulations of the time,
place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative chan-
nels of communication.” (citation omitted)).  The Court recognized the created
right of freedom of association on previous occasions.  For example, in 1961, the
Supreme Court balanced the public interest and the freedom of individual action
when reviewing a statute that compelled members of the Communist Party to
disclose its membership list. See Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1961).  It should also be noted that the
Court may have moved in this direction as “many scholars regard the right of
peaceable assembly as vital but essentially submerged within the other expressive
freedoms of the First Amendment.” MARGARET M. RUSSELL, FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
AND PETITION: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 185 (Mar-
garet M. Russell ed., 2010).
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violated when a public school district and its teachers’ bargain-
ing representative grant a teacher-chosen union access to cer-
tain physical means of communications (in this case, school
mailboxes) while denying those means to others.143  The Court
“made slight mention of the right of assembly” and instead
used “doctrinal language . . . straight out of [its] free speech
cases.”144  The Court noted that a public school’s modes of
communication were in a sense a private right for the school
itself, and thus the school could curtail speech rights within its
private property.145  The Court further noted that “limited pub-
lic forum” analysis would be the incorrect standard to apply in
a case concerning limiting spaces where groups could commu-
nicate.  Rather, restricting the use of the modes of communica-
tions was appropriate so long as the restriction was
“reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”146  How-
ever, the Court never explained how a public school had a
private right when shifting its decision away from a limited
public forum analysis.  Since the Perry decision, “even cases
involving protests or demonstrations could now be resolved
without reference to assembly.”147
The Court eventually recognized the freedom of expressive
association as a First Amendment right, although the right is
not specifically enumerated.148  When reviewing the claims
under the freedom of expressive association, the Court focuses
on whether “the inclusion of a particular individual would im-
pair the message the organization seeks to impart.”149  In es-
sence, the freedom of expressive association forces the courts
to make ad hoc determinations as to whether a government’s
regulation undermines an organization’s message.150  The
Court replaced the broad protections envisioned by the Fram-
ers that would safeguard both the sanctity of the unified collec-
tive and the manifestations of their collective consciousness
with the fictional “freedom of expressive association,” which
143 Perry, 460 U.S. at 44.
144 INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE, supra note 71, at 61. R
145 Perry, 460 U.S. at 47–48.
146 Id. at 46–47, 55 (accusing the Court of Appeals of “misapplying our cases
that have dealt with the rights of free expression on streets, parks and other fora
generally open for assembly and debate”).
147 Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, supra note 42, at 610–11. R
148 Mazzone, supra note 53, at 644; see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. R
609, 617–18 (2002) (describing two lines of decisions that have recognized a
“constitutionally protected ‘freedom of association’”).
149 Mazzone, supra note 53, at 644. R
150 See id. at 646.
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only protects the expressive manifestations of the assembly.
The manifestations and use of the collective consciousness cre-
ated through the assembly then fall within the purview of the
Speech Clause.151
The Perry152 decision left the Assembly Clause void of an
identity, deficient in nature, and standardless.153  The militari-
zation of police forces made possible through the National De-
fense Authorization Act often leaves dissenting and minority
views staring down the barrel of a gun, or rather an armored
tank traveling down Main Street, ready to suppress an other-
wise peaceable protest.  The simultaneous dismantling of the
Assembly Clause and the creation of the militarized police force
leaves United States history poised for a great story: David v.
Goliath.
II
1208, 1033, AND THE RISE OF THE LOCAL MILITARIZED
POLICE FORCE154
A. Legislative-Historical Outline
With the current understanding of the Assembly Clause in
mind, it is useful to explore how local law enforcement acquires
151 See Brod, supra note 76, at 184–85.  Brod describes how the shift from the R
right to peaceably assemble to outright ignoring it brings manifestations, such as
the Occupy Wall Street protests in New York City, under the “confines of free
speech jurisprudence.” Id. at 184.  This is extremely alarming because if a mani-
festation does not constitute “speech,” “the moving party has no basis upon which
to launch a First Amendment challenge.” Id. at 184–85.  Therefore, assembly
itself does not have any true protections.  It either falls under the protections of
the freedom of speech or it gets the speech-like protections provided by the free-
dom of expressive association.
152 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
153 As I previously noted, the standard for assessing freedom of assembly
cases is now the one applied for freedom of association, which is that of free
speech.  Thus, the freedom of assembly is standardless because the Court con-
flates the two freedoms.
154 It should be noted from the onset that the 1208 and 1033 programs are not
the beginning or the end of the militarization of local police forces.  As Radley
Balko explains in his book, the militarization of police was a long political,
legislative, and judicial movement based on a rising national crime rate and
national fixation on narcotics prohibitions. See BALKO, supra note 29.  The rise of R
militarization began with military-trained police SWAT teams in Los Angeles
meant to combat the apparent danger that drug crimes posed to police forces. See
id. at 51–64.  Over time, due to the War on Drugs and obsession over crime rates,
politicians on both sides of the aisle fought for tougher crime bills in Congress and
eventually partnerships between the federal government and state law
enforcement agencies that provided military equipment to local state law
enforcement agencies. See generally id. at 81–136 (detailing the progression of
police-force militarization in the 1970s).  Thus, the militarization of police forces
forms part of a longer progression that intersects with politics.  The 1208 and
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military equipment.  This Note argues that the use of military
equipment by police forces violates peaceful protestors’ right to
peaceably assemble.  The manner in which police forces ac-
quire that equipment is salient to this analysis.
Every year, the U.S. Congress approves and passes the
Department of Defense’s yearly budget through the National
Defense Authorization Act.155  Aside from specifying the budget
and expenditures used by the department, there are usually
earmarked bills accompanying the Act.156  In 1990, section
1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act157 included a
provision authorizing the transfer of surplus military equip-
ment from the Department of Defense to law enforcement agen-
cies throughout the United States.158  The provision provided,
in pertinent part, that “the Secretary of Defense may transfer to
Federal and State agencies personal property of the Depart-
ment of Defense, including small arms and ammunition, that
the Secretary determines is—(A) suitable for use by such agen-
cies in counter-drug activities; and (B) excess to the needs of
the Department of Defense.”159  Furthermore, it conditioned
the transfer of the materials on the respective local police forces
paying for the retrieval and transportation of the equipment
requested.160  The program lasted for a year, until its
reauthorization in 1991.161  Originally, the Department of De-
fense, by way of the Pentagon, operated the 1208 program, with
1033 programs form just a small part of that historical trajectory, but they are
extremely illuminating as they facilitate the smooth transfer of military equipment
to the local state agencies without many obstacles and in a quantifiable manner.
See generally id. (describing historical trajectory of police-force militarization).
155 This seems like a pretty important issue, especially since there is a new
version of the bill every year; however, the NDAA is so obscure that Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel had to ask his staffers to explain it to him.  Jon Harper, How
and Why Local Police Departments Get Military Surplus Equipment, STARS AND
STRIPES (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.stripes.com/how-and-why-local-police-
departments-get-military-surplus-equipment-1.299570 [http://perma.cc/4D4F-
D4JA].
156 See, e.g., OFFICE OF U.S. SEN. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, INVESTIGATION OF HOUSE FY
2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT EARMARKS 2 (2011) (finding 115 ear-
marks in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 despite a
formal ban on earmarks).
157 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L.
No. 101–189, § 1208, 103 Stat. 1352 (1989).
158 Harper, supra note 155. R
159 National Defense Authorization Act § 1208(a)(1).
160 Id. § 1208(b).
161 H.R. REP. NO. 104-724, at 788 (1997) (Conf. Rep.).
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help from Regional Law Enforcement Support offices from 1990
to 1997.162
The Act was again amended to last indefinitely in 1997 by
section 1033, from where the program derives its current
name.163  The amended section included the addition of the
term “counter-terrorism” as a use suitable for the program and
small changes to the manner in which the Department trans-
fers the equipment.164  The amendment also transferred pro-
gram management duties to the Defense and Logistics Agency
(DLA).165  The year 1997 also saw the creation of the National
Program Office at DLA Headquarters and consolidation activi-
ties.166  However, this venture ended in 1999.167  From 1999 to
2009, the DLA Law Enforcement Support Office ran the 1033
program.168  However, beginning in 2009, the Transition of
Function to Defense Reutilization & Marketing Service (DRMS),
renamed DLA Disposition Services, took ownership.169
The legislative history behind the passage of section 1208,
and later the amendment of section 1033, is not widely pub-
lished or talked about.  It appears, however, that two forces
prompted the legislation: a continually surging U.S. Armed
Forces with excess, aging equipment, and the local police de-
partments’ desire to expand their reach and effectiveness in
various spheres such as the War on Drugs and gang violence
for the greater protection of police officers.170  Further evidence
can be gleaned from the fact that section 1033 is found within
162 DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY, 1033 PROGRAM FAQS, http://www.dispositionser
vices.dla.mil/leso/pages/1033programfaqs.aspx [http://perma.cc/WM7D-
GASD].
163 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No.
104–201, § 1033, 110 Stat. 2639 (1996); BALKO, supra note 29, at 209 (“ ‘the 1033 R
program,’ named for the section of US Code assigned to it”).  Balko also provides
some amazing statistics: in 1033’s first three years, “the office handled 3.4 million
orders for Pentagon gear from 11,000 police agencies in all fifty states.  By 2005,
the number of police agencies serviced by the office hit 17,000.  . . .  [B]etween
1997 and 1999 the office doled out $727 million worth of equipment, including
253 aircraft . . . .” Id. at 210.
164 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 § 1033.
165 DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY, supra note 162. R
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See Taylor Wofford, How America’s Police Became an Army: The 1033 Pro-
gram, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/how-americas-
police-became-army-1033-program-264537 [https://perma.cc/P55C-WU93]
(“Faced with a bloated military and what it perceived as a worsening drug crisis,
the 101st Congress in 1990 enacted the National Defense Authorization Act. . . .
The idea was that if the U.S. wanted its police to act like drug warriors, it should
equip them like warriors . . . .”).
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Subtitle C in the index of the public law: the subtitle’s designa-
tion is “Counter-Drug Activities.”171  Under the auspices of this
program, the Department of Defense has already transferred
$4.3 billion worth of property to police forces since 1997.172
The massive transfer of military equipment to local police
forces is exactly what Congress foresaw with the 1997 NDAA.
By 1996, counter-drug activities were not the only concerns on
Congress’ list.  In the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center
bombings,173 counter-terrorism activities by local and federal
law enforcement started increasing.174  On June 18, 1996,
then-Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia explained that the pro-
posed amendments to the bill during its drafting by Senator
Dick Lugar of Indiana, Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico,
and himself175 “will strengthen the ability of the Department of
Defense and the Department of Energy to assist local fire de-
partments and police departments, local law enforcement, in
terms of helping prepare them and equip them to deal with a
possible chemical or biological attack by terrorists.”176  Mr.
Nunn further explained on the floor, “We are talking about
having [the Department of Defense] help prepare, in terms of
171 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. 104–201,
110 Stat. 2430 (1996).
172 KARA DANSKY, ACLU, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF
AMERICAN POLICING 24 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/
jus14-warcomeshome-report-web-rel1.pdf [http://perma.cc/W2S4-JYVG].
173 Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) referred to this attack at the NDAA hearing:
We had the World Trade Center attack.  We have seen the devasta-
tion of that explosion.  What many people do not realize, and what
the judge noted in his findings, is that attack on the World Trade
Center also included a chemical weapon that was consumed by the
flames and, therefore, did not activate and did not cause damage.
The damage was done by the conventional-type weapons.
S. Res. 142, 104th Cong., 90 CONG. REC. 6372 (1996) (enacted).
174 See LOIS M. DAVIS ET AL., RAND CORP., LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF LAW ENFORCE-
MENT’S POST-9/11 FOCUS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY, 15–17,
22–27, 48–51, 59–60 (2010), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
monographs/2010/RAND_MG1031.pdf [https://perma.cc/W89V-MUD3].
175 The fact that this was a bipartisan amendment—Senator Nunn was a
Democrat while Senator Lugar and Domenici were Republicans—further illumi-
nates the rallying of political parties around the War on Drugs, and certainly
foreshadows the country’s fixation on the War on Terror.  The 1997 NDAA was
certainly different in nature from the previous NDAA.  As Senator Nunn, who had
worked on the Armed Services Committee for several years, was getting ready to
leave the Senate, he was especially involved in the crafting of the 1997 NDAA.  He
was so involved that his colleague and then-Senator President pro tempore Sena-
tor Storm Thurmond (R-SC), had a “hope that this bill will serve as a clear legacy
to Senator Nunn’s enduring contributions to the U.S. Armed Forces and this
Nation’s security.”  S. Res. 142, 104th Cong., 90 CONG. REC. 6370 (1996)
(enacted).
176 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN304.txt unknown Seq: 28 14-MAR-16 10:01
804 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:777
training, in terms of equipment, our local police, and fire offi-
cials around this country to deal with what almost all experts
on terrorism believe is an inevitable kind of threat we face to
our own country.”177  Thus, section 1033 found itself in a bill
geared toward the mobilization of local police forces not just
against counter-drug activities that occurred during the previ-
ous two decades but also against a new menace: domestic
terrorism.
Interestingly, the section 1033 amendment was not even a
focal point of the 1997 NDAA.  On the Senate floor, then-Presi-
dent pro tempore Senator Storm Thurmond of South Carolina
outlined the priorities of the bill:
Ensuring national security and the status of the United
States as the world’s preeminent military power; protecting
the readiness of our Armed Forces; enhancing the quality of
life of military personnel and their families; ensuring U.S.
military superiority by continuing to fund a more robust,
progressive modernization program to provide required capa-
bilities for the future; accelerating the development and de-
ployment of missile defense systems; and preserving the
shipbuilding and submarine industrial base.178
Thus, it appears that the amendment’s purpose was to supple-
ment the overall goals of the 1997 NDAA, namely modernizing
the military (by getting rid of old equipment, given to the states
at their request), and strengthening antiterrorism and antidrug
capabilities of local law enforcement agencies.  The 1997 NDAA
then left the states with a choice as to how they would ap-
proach the War on Drugs, and eventually the War on Terror.
The new section 1303 enabled the acquisition of military-grade
equipment by local law enforcement agencies.179  However, it
was up to the agencies to request and acquire the equipment.
The types of equipment distributed included “[h]umvees,
mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, aircraft (ro-
tary and fixed wing), boats, sniper scopes and M-16s.”180  In
essence, the materials transferred to law enforcement agencies
are not the type that are seen as “necessary” in the traditional
sense of law enforcement.  The types of materials that the De-
partment of Defense transfers to local law enforcement agen-
cies are the types of materials used in wars and combat fields
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See Taylor Wofford, How America’s Police Became an Army: The 1033 Pro-
gram, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/how-americas-po
lice-became-army-1033-program-264537 [http://perma.cc/5EML-5RYW].
180 Harper, supra note 155. R
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in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq.181  These same weap-
ons are now in our very own backyards.
B. “You Got the Stuff?”:182 What, When, and How Local
Enforcement Agencies Acquire Equipment
Distribution powers lay with the Department of Defense,
and more specifically with the Secretary of Defense.183  The
Department of Defense is not an isolated actor, however.  The
DOD holds an annual conference at which the Secretary of
Defense, “in cooperation with the Attorney General, shall con-
duct an annual briefing of law enforcement personnel of each
State (including law enforcement personnel of the political sub-
divisions of each State) regarding information, training, techni-
cal support, and equipment and facilities available to civilian
law enforcement personnel from the Department of De-
fense.”184  Thus, the government is, at least minimally, aware
of the wishes of local law enforcement departments.  Internally,
the DOD follows the protocol set forth by the Defense Disposi-
tion Manual, section 4160.21-M.185  In 1997, the manual un-
derwent a “total revision” following the inception of the 1033
program.186  The DLA provides its own guidance to the agency
through DLA Instruction 1111.187  This internal instruction
“describes the processes used by DLA to provide support to
181 See, e.g., Paul McLeary, US Donates More Abrams Tanks, Humvees to Iraq,
DEFENSENEWS (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy
-budget/warfare/2015/01/06/isil-iraq-abrams-Humvee/21341453/ [http://
perma.cc/DN9Y-7VAJ].
182 SCARFACE (Universal Pictures 1983).  Similar to the side effects of drugs,
which often impair mental capacity, military weapons can lead to psychological
pressures within high command of police forces—a sort of “high.”  Balko refers to
Peter Kraska’s criminal justice study where Kraska conducted an ethnography
within various SWAT teams and police agencies.  Balko states that “[o]ne general
dynamic he observed was a kind of masculinity-infused arms race between police
agencies that could often lead to an inferiority complex at smaller
departments . . . .  ‘It’s almost like they would get their own high off the money and
the equipment.’” BALKO, supra note 29, at 210.  Kraska eventually went to a R
shooting range with the SWAT members and took a couple of shots with a gun
when the SWAT members suggested he try.  Kraska noted that “what disturbed
me most was how I, a person who had so thoroughly thought out militarism,
could have so easily enjoyed experiencing it.”  Peter B. Kraska, Playing War:
Masculinity, Militarism, and Their Real-World Consequences, in MILITARIZING THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND
THE POLICE 142 (Peter B. Kraska ed., 2001).
183 10 U.S.C. § 2576(a) (2012).
184 Id. § 380.
185 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE MATERIEL DISPOSITION MANUAL (1997).
186 Id. at i.
187 DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY IN-
STRUCTION 1111, LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT (LES) (as modified on Dec. 9, 2009).
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Law Enforcement Activities (LEA).”188  Furthermore, “[s]pecial
request procedures are in place for the transfer of excess weap-
ons and aircraft.”189
When requesting equipment, law enforcement agencies
need only ask for specific equipment through the DLA website.
In this way, the DLA, and consequently the U.S. government,
acts as a conduit through which local law enforcement agen-
cies ask for high-tech, military-grade equipment.  It is almost
like a general utilities store: if you can afford to buy it (in this
case, if you can afford to transport it), then it is yours!  At the
DLA website, law enforcement agencies may access the “Law
Enforcement Agency (LEA) Application for Participation”
form.190  After filling out the one-page application, the LEA
then awaits the DLA’s approval.  After obtaining the approval,
the LEA works with the 1033 state coordinator in order to
provide the equipment it desires.191 It is that easy.
III
MILITARIZATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PRACTICAL
RESPONSES BY THE U.S. COURTS
A. Assembly Redux
Militarized police activity in the midst of an otherwise
peaceable protest is an implicit violation of the right to peacea-
bly assemble.  I arrive at this conclusion based on my proposed
legal standard for “true” Assembly Clause cases: a balancing
test.192  I propose that when reviewing an Assembly Clause
188 Id. at 1.  The regulation sheds more light on the operation of the 1033
program.  It provides the following:
The DLA LES Office (LESO) administers and executes section
2576a, Title 10, United States Code, for the Director, DLA, at the
direction of the Secretaries of Defense.  The LESO transfers excess
Department of Defense (DoD) personal property deemed suitable for
use to Federal and state law enforcement activities.  This process is
known as the 1033 Program.
Id.
189 Id. at 3.  They also note “see LESO Standard Operating Procedures (SOP),
located on the LESO share drive.”  Id.
190 LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (LEA) APPLICATION FOR PARTICIPATION, http://dis
positionservices.dla.mil/leso/Documents/LESO%20Forms/application.pdf
[perma.cc/3RG5-8AB2].
191 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., APPLICATION TO PARTICIPATE: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1033 EXCESS PROPERTY PROGRAM (June 23, 2015), http://dps.mo.gov/dir/pro
grams/cjle/documents/dod/1033application.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P3R-T9
HP].  Yes, participation is that easy.
192 There is a clear limitation to this approach.  Like most legal tests, the
balancing approach only provides a procedural right or protection.  Someone
claiming a violation relies on the judgment of a judge for the substantive protec-
tion.  This requires a judge to understand the original aim of the Assembly Clause
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case, courts should balance the plaintiff’s interests against the
defendant’s, as they once did.193  The courts should balance
traditional factors such as whether or not the assembly is
peaceable, whether the assembly is a minority or dissenting
group,194 whether the group is assembled or manifesting on a
traditionally public area, such as a park, or whether the state
has a permit requirement195 or if they are on private land.196  If
the case involves a manifestation such as a parade or a march,
the court should ask whether the state had a permit require-
ment,197 and whether there was a police response to the mani-
and the sanctity of an assembly.  Without this understanding, this test will likely
fail to provide adequate protection.  This is especially troubling for dissenters or
protestors because they already lack ample access to a certain substantive right
(hence the protest).  Adding another procedural protection may lead to some sub-
stantive right, but it is not guaranteed.  This is a key pitfall of most tests and a
common critique from critical race theorists. See Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, 28–29 (2d ed. 2012).
193 See, e.g., Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1 (1961).  The balancing test in this case is different from the one I
propose, and the Court applied it for a different purpose.  In Communist Party, as I
discuss in subpart I.B supra, the Court examined a section of the Control Act,
balanced its “rational relation” to the goals of the overall act, and counterbalanced
any civil liberties that would suffer consequences.  The test I suggest deals with a
police force that is the product of legislation.  However, legislation is not at the
heart of the issue, but rather the product of that legislation is.  The fact that the
Supreme Court made a balance of constitutional rights after finding that the
section of the Control Act satisfied the Court’s rational relation test shows the
great amount of respect for the First Amendment protections.  Thus, I draw inspi-
ration from the balancing test in Communist Party in my proposed balancing
scheme and weigh the purpose of the product of police militarization against the
original meaning and vision for the Assembly Clause.
194 Being a majority group should not adversely affect a group in the balancing
test.  However, a dissenting group should have greater protections since the As-
sembly Clause was aimed, in part, at protecting their views.
195 A word is in order for the use of permits.  At one point, the use of permits
would be absurd; however, this is no longer the case. See Abu El-Haj, supra note
41, at 554–57.  Extensive permit requirements for gatherings on public streets are R
very common within the states. Id. at 448 n.14.  This change is usually thought to
have started in Massachusetts in the case of Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43
(1897), where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Boston ordinance requiring a
permit for parades.  This decision was partially due to the fact that the Assembly
Clause was not yet incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to the
states, which happened in 1925.  In 1939, after incorporation, the Supreme Court
would strike down an ordinance requiring a permit because it gave unfettered
discretion to the licensing official.  Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,
516 (1939).
196 Assembling on private land leads to tort implications such as simple tres-
pass and it is “assumed that, as a general proposition, there is no right under the
First Amendment to engage in any form of expression upon private property
without the consent of the owner, express or implied.”  EMERSON, supra note 46, at R
298.
197 The court should also make an assessment of the permit requirement.  The
permit requirement must be limited to considerations of time, place, and manner.
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festation.  If there was a police response, the court should then
assess whether or not the response was subjectively reasona-
ble.  The subjective standard is intended to protect minority
views that would otherwise not be expressed because of the
fear of a person with riot gear—such as a semiautomatic
weapon—standing across the street.  Finally, the court looks at
the hardship or burden of a continuous and extended assem-
bly.  The court considers factors such as continuous time, size
of assembly, noise, and any disturbances the assembly causes.
In making this balancing test, the court looks at the As-
sembly Clause’s original purpose to protect the sanctity of the
assembly, including its members, the ideas shared, the conclu-
sions made, and the manifestations that grew from that pro-
cess.  An aggressive police force with tanks, rifles, and SWAT
units that look like Navy SEALS198 severely encroaches on that
sanctity.
The question then arises as to what this balancing princi-
ple actually looks like in application.  I turn to two situations in
which I apply this new balancing test.  The first is the eviction
of the Occupy Wall Street protestors from throughout the coun-
try.199  The Occupy Movement raised tents in public parks as
they conducted twenty-four-hour occupations.  The occupants
chanted, sang songs, played musical instruments, and waved
signs.  Public parks are spaces where the Assembly Clause was
traditionally protected.200  Parks served as a center of congre-
gation for the masses.  By the twenty-first century, actions
within public parks grew limited due to permit requirements
and other legislative restrictions.201  Under Perry, many courts
viewed the Occupy Movement in light of freedom of speech
jurisprudence, mainly through “intermediate scrutiny” of the
Furthermore, the permit statute cannot authorize denial of a permit based on the
content of the speaker’s intended communication. See Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569, 575-78 (1941).
198 I make the comparison between SWAT teams and Navy SEALS because
SWAT teams can be thought of as “police officers plus.”  As Balko explains, SWAT
teams are often trained by the U.S. military. BALKO, supra note 29, at 208 (“Some R
43 percent of police departments in Kraska’s survey told him they had used
active-duty military personnel to train the SWAT team when it was first started,
and 46 percent were training on a regular basis ‘with active-duty military experts
in special operations,’ usually the Army Rangers or Navy Seals.”).  This is just
another way of getting around the Posse Comitatus Act, which forbids the U.S.
military from conducting law enforcement.
199 See Brod, supra note 76, at 181–88 (describing the Occupy Movement). R
200 See generally Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985) (describing the obstacles governments face in terms of restricting
speech in certain public fora).
201 See id.
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expressions of the movements.202  Other courts sided with the
local governments by holding that governments had a substan-
tial interest in the appearance and safety203 of their parks, that
their regulations against overnight sleeping were narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that interest,204 and that their content-neutral
time, place, and manner regulations allowed the protestors to
use other channels of expression.205  The government moved
hundreds of protesters from public parks and quashed the
Occupy Movement throughout the country by using the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard formulated for the Speech Clause,
not the Assembly Clause.
Under my suggested balancing scheme, Occupy would
likely meet the same fate but under a historically accurate
logic.  The first dispositive inquiry is whether or not the assem-
bly was peaceable.  One of the proudest characteristics of the
Occupy Movements was their peaceable nature.206  Once the
court finds a peaceful assembly, it then should turn to balanc-
ing the parties’ interests.  Here, the plaintiffs have two goals in
mind: (1) stopping a subjectively disruptive protest and (2) free-
ing the park for other uses.  The defendants also have two main
goals: (1) getting a message across and (2) assembling.  At face
value, the defendants’ interests are higher because only a com-
pelling interest should, in theory (and, at times, in practice),
override the exercise of constitutional rights.  Next, the court
determines whether or not the assembly took place in a public
or private location.  Here, the Occupy Movement took place in
different parks across the country.  Those in public parks have
the natural protection granted by the Assembly Clause.  The
protestors in New York City, however, were not protected be-
cause Zuccotti Park is privately owned.  The next step is to
examine prospective burdens.  This is where the Occupy Move-
ment fails.  Although there is not, and likely should not be, a
bright-line rule as to when assembly drags on “too long,” a year
of continuous occupation of a public park is certainly a burden
on the state and on those not involved in the assembly.  A
202 Brod, supra note 76, at 188–89 (noting that the courts reviewing the Oc- R
cupy protests  applied “the deferential intermediate-scrutiny standard”).
203 Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252 (D. Conn. 2012).
204 Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120
(2012).
205 Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071
(D. Minn. 2011).
206 See Matt Sledge, Homeland Security Tracked Occupy Wall Street ‘Peaceful
Activist Demonstrations,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/04/02/homeland-security-occupy-wall-street_n_3002445.html
[http://perma.cc/CF3V-TANS].
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prolonged assembly such as the one in Zuccotti Park deprived
other community members of their access to green areas in an
urban metropolis.  The City of New York deployed officers on
the park for constant surveillance and could have used these
officers elsewhere in the city.  The last factor is the use of police
force.  However, since police action did not take place until
after an injunction against eviction was denied, the revision of
the last factor is not necessary here.
A situation where police force is relevant in the assembly
clause query is the Ferguson, Missouri, protests in 2014.  In
Ferguson, many citizens took to the streets in an effort to raise
awareness around, primarily, the killing of an unarmed black
teenager, Michael Brown, by a white police officer.207  Pro-
testing in the streets is permissible under Assembly Clause
jurisprudence as long as it is not dangerous and does not ob-
struct a highway.  Neither of these two factors was present in
the peaceable208 Ferguson manifestations.  Here, the balancing
test takes a different turn.  There is currently no court case
pending to quash protests.  However, under the proposed test
for the enforcement of the Assembly Clause, the protestors
have every right to sue the local government for an implicit
infringement of their right to peaceably assemble.  This conclu-
sion is based entirely on two factors: (1) the fact that the protes-
tors are assembled in a permissible area, as previously
discussed, and (2) the use of militarized police tactics in quel-
ling the peaceful protests.  The Assembly Clause does not only
protect the actual grouping of individuals and consequences of
that grouping but also the sanctity of assembly itself.  Essen-
tially, if a group cannot peaceably assemble, then the Assembly
Clause is violated on its face.  Once the police force employs
fear-mongering tactics, the Assembly Clause is violated in its
traditional sense, and police forces must retreat to their origi-
nal peace-keeping tasks.
207 See generally N.Y. TIMES, What Happened in Ferguson?, http://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-af
ter-police-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/WTX4-RXY9] (describing the Fergu-
son incident and the community response it engendered).
208 Despite the media’s attempt at portraying the movement in Ferguson as a
protest or riots, the movement is very peaceful. See Amanda Gutterman, If You
Think Looters and Arsonists Are the Only Ones Protesting Ferguson, Think Again,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/25/
ferguson-peaceful-protests_n_6221234.html [http://perma.cc/6TK5-D6DH].
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CONCLUSION209
The history of the Assembly Clause is set in stone.  The
current jurisprudence is not.  With protests on the rise across
the world,210 and especially in our country,211 it is time for the
Supreme Court to turn from its recently mistaken reading of
the Assembly Clause and reinstate the original meaning of the
Clause.  The Court must see the right to peaceably assemble
“in its classical form: a group of individuals gathering together
to discuss, debate, picket or demonstrate in order to further a
lawful purpose.”212  The Court views that freedom, in its mod-
ern form, through the lens of the created freedom of associa-
tion.213  The current jurisprudence rids the Assembly Clause of
its essential concept: unity, fellowship, and autonomy.  The
Assembly Clause should be viewed in light of the greater con-
stitutional movement—as a revolution.  The Constitution codi-
fied that revolution and attempted to capture and contain that
kinetic energy and focus it into constantly creating itself anew
through public discourse vis-a`-vis the Assembly Clause and
the rest of the Constitution’s guarantees.214  The First Amend-
ment serves a unique purpose: it provides a voice to the voice-
less and a platform for dissenters and minority views and it
safeguards peaceable political discourse through human fel-
209 Although the Supreme Court can remedy part of the problem
retroactively—which might provide a form of deterrence—by reviving the
Assembly Clause, legislation may be needed to curb the reach of local police forces
when responding to assembled groups.  Questions of possible overreach of police
power are too far reaching to address in this Note; however, it is imperative to
scrutinize the effects of the militarization of local police—and the legislative
measures that allow for it—beyond how they relate to the Assembly Clause.
210 Government actions have spurred massive protests in the United States
(recently concerning police brutality), Mexico (concerning corruption and the dis-
appearance of student protestors), Spain, and countries involved in the Arab
Spring. See, Ioan Grillo, Are the Missing Students Protests Turning into a Mexican
Spring?, NBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014, 8:20 AM), www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/
are-missing-stduents-protests-turning-mexican-spring-n262266 [http://
perma.cc/CX5M-44Y5].
211 Simply take a look at the mass response in New York City to the non-
indictment of Eric Garner and other police brutality-related protests in places like
Berkeley, California. See Holley, supra note 20. R
212 Rische, supra note 43, at 331. R
213 Id.
214 As Emerson notes, “a system of free expression is designed to encourage a
necessary degree of conflict within a society.” EMERSON, supra note 46, at 11. R
Emerson goes on to explain, although not explicitly, the nature of the American
legal system.  He describes a cyclical system akin to my suggestion of the codified
revolution.  In essence, he describes a cycle of peaceable unrest, discourse, ulti-
mate harmony through consensus, and then eventual unrest.  This cycle is the
very institution that the Constitution, the First Amendment, and the Assembly
Clause were meant to safeguard.
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lowship.  The current jurisprudence effectively neutralizes the
Assembly Clause and rids it of any effectiveness.  In the year
2014, the Assembly Clause is nothing more than words on a
page, which makes our own public dissents subject to a force-
ful, autonomous hand: police officers.
